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FIT, JUSTIFICATION, AND FIDELITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
JAMES E. FLEMING

There is . . . a peculiar logical pleasure in making manifest the continuity
between what we are doing and what has been done before. But the present
has a right to govern itself so far as it can; and it ought always to be
remembered that historic continuity with the past is not a duty, it is only a
necessity.
– Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1920, pp. 139)
I.

RONALD DWORKIN: A EULOGY

Ronald Dworkin is widely and rightly viewed as the most important legal
philosopher and constitutional theorist of our time, and as one of the leading
figures in moral and political philosophy. In the words of Marshall Cohen,
Dworkin’s Taking Rights Seriously ‘is the most important work in
jurisprudence since H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of Law and, from a
philosophical point of view at least, the most sophisticated contribution to that
subject yet made by an American writer’. And Cohen wrote those words about
Dworkin’s first book in 1977! Dworkin’s many outstanding subsequent books
and articles made good on that early, prescient assessment. Dworkin is
unmatched and unrivaled in legal philosophy and constitutional theory.
Over the years, I have organized a number of conferences in constitutional
theory, and Dworkin was often the most appropriate keynote speaker. In
conferences at Fordham University School of Law on ‘Fidelity in
Constitutional Interpretation’ and ‘Rawls and the Law’, and at Boston
University School of Law on his book, Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin
delivered powerful and eloquent keynote lectures (Dworkin 1997; Dworkin
2004; Dworkin 2010a). The readers of this Essay are likely familiar with the
countless accounts of Dworkin’s brilliance as a lecturer, of how he spoke
without notes and with great flair, making it all seem so graceful and effortless.
Even more impressive, in my experience, was how seriously he took his
lectures and how energetically he responded to his interlocutors. In the
conference at Boston University on the penultimate draft of Justice for
Hedgehogs, held in 2009 when Dworkin was seventy-eight years old, he
demonstrated his characteristic energy by responding extemporaneously to all
thirty-one commentators, one panel at a time, and elaborating those initial
thoughts in a published response (Dworkin 2010b). I had the privilege of
writing the biographical entry on Dworkin in the Yale Biographical Dictionary
of American Law, and closed that entry by stating: ‘His work abounds with
indefatigable energy, giving the impression that he would not stop making
arguments until he put the clamps of reason upon every rational being’


Professor of Law, The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law, and
Associate Dean for Research and Intellectual Life, Boston University School of Law. I have
adapted this Essay from a previously published article (Fleming 2013). I incorporate the
eulogy to Ronald Dworkin from another piece (Fleming 2014). Thanks to Courtney
Gesualdi for helpful comments and to Jessica Lees for helpful formatting.
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(Fleming 2009, p. 179). Dworkin substantially revised the draft of Justice for
Hedgehogs in light of the Boston University Symposium and incorporated
many of his responses.
Dworkin’s work in legal philosophy and constitutional theory was so
powerful and fecund that it could inspire many careers wholly dedicated to
building upon it and working out its implications. Dworkin (along with John
Rawls) has been a powerful inspiration for my own work in constitutional
theory. My Securing Constitutional Democracy: The Case of Autonomy puts
forward a ‘Constitution-perfecting’ theory that aims, in the spirit of Dworkin,
to interpret the U.S. Constitution so as to make it the best it can be (Fleming
2006, pp. 4-6, 73-74, 210-11). Sotirios Barber’s and my book, Constitutional
Interpretation: The Basic Questions, is a response to Dworkin’s call, in Taking
Rights Seriously, for a ‘fusion of constitutional law and moral theory’ (Barber
& Fleming 2007, p. xiii (quoting Dworkin 1977, p. 149)). And Linda
McClain’s and my book, Ordered Liberty: Rights, Responsibilities, and
Virtues, responds to charges that liberals like Dworkin take rights too
seriously, developing a civic liberalism that takes responsibilities and civic
virtues – as well as rights – seriously (Fleming & McClain 2013, p. 3).
Dworkin’s successor as Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford University,
John Gardner, put it well when he said: ‘The loss of Ronnie takes a bit of the
sparkle out of life as a philosopher of law’ (Gardner 2013). But those who
knew Dworkin and learned from his teaching and writing will never forget the
thrill of engaging with him and building upon his work. His sparkling prose,
the staggering ambition and monumental achievements of his works, and the
flair and gusto of his arguments and insights will never cease to illuminate and
inspire. We shall not look upon his like again. Ronald Dworkin made legal
philosophy and constitutional theory the best they can be.
II.

AGAINST INTERPRETIVE OBLIGATION TO FOLLOW THE PAST

Dworkin famously argued that the best interpretation of the Constitution
should fit and justify the legal materials, for example, the text, original
meaning, and precedents (Dworkin 1986, p. 239). In his recent book, Against
Obligation (Greene 2012), Abner Greene provocatively and creatively bucks
the tendencies of constitutional theorists to profess fidelity with the past in
constitutional interpretation. He rejects originalist understandings of obligation
to follow original meaning in interpreting the Constitution, even of the sort
associated with Jack Balkin’s abstract living originalism (Balkin 2011) (which
aspires to fidelity to the abstract commitments of, rather than the concrete
expectations of, the founding generation). And indeed he rejects interpretive
obligation to follow precedent, even of the type illustrated by David Strauss’s
flexible living constitutionalism (Strauss 2010). Greene provides powerful
arguments against views that original meaning and precedent are dispositive of
constitutional meaning and decision. He argues that we the people today
should decide questions of constitutional meaning, commitment, and justice for
ourselves, by our own best lights.
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In this Essay I focus on Greene’s arguments (2012, pp. 169-71, 192-97, 20104) against interpretive obligation to the past, in particular, his argument that
even constitutional theorists like Ronald Dworkin (1986) and I (2006) give too
much deference or weight to ‘fit’ and precedent, and not enough primacy to
‘justification’ and justice, in our approaches to constitutional interpretation. I
should begin by observing that both Greene and I are, broadly speaking,
Dworkinians, or moral readers. By that I mean that we conceive the
Constitution in significant part as a scheme of abstract moral commitments, not
a code of concrete historical rules. And we conceive interpretation of the
Constitution as requiring judgments about what interpretation best ‘fits’ and
‘justifies’ the constitutional document, order, and practice. Interpretation is not
a matter of discovering and enforcing historically determined answers provided
by the framers and ratifiers (whether original intentions, understandings, or
public meanings).
Hence, it is no surprise that I largely agree with Greene’s account of the
place of fit and justification in constitutional interpretation. And so, in what
follows, it may seem like we are having a heated agreement. Even where we
disagree, it may seem that we are having a family quarrel. But I do think the
engagement is worthwhile, for it provides an occasion for me to clarify and
sharpen Dworkin’s and my own arguments about fit, justification, and fidelity
in constitutional interpretation. This Essay is part of my book in progress
entitled Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution (Fleming forthcoming). This
book will criticize all forms of Originalism, and it will further develop my
arguments in previous books for what Dworkin called a ‘moral reading’ of the
Constitution (Dworkin 1996) and what I have called a ‘philosophic approach’
to constitutional interpretation (Barber & Fleming 2007, pp. 16, 211, 225, 227)
and a ‘Constitution-perfecting theory’ that would interpret the Constitution so
as to make it the best it can be (Dworkin 1996; Fleming 2006, pp. 161-63).
Again, Greene (2012, pp. 161-63) argues against interpretative obligation to
the past, whether to concrete original meaning or precedents (as he puts it,
whether to ‘higher’ or ‘prior’ authorities). He makes cogent arguments against
originalism as conventionally understood. His arguments zero in on
originalists’ assumptions or claims that we are obligated to follow the original
understanding or original meaning, concretely conceived as the original
expected applications of the framers and ratifiers. His arguments also target
originalists’ aims or claims to avoid making moral and philosophic choices in
constitutional interpretation. Such choices, he rightly argues, are inevitable and
indeed desirable. In a nutshell, he shows that originalists unsuccessfully
attempt to stress fit to the exclusion of justification (Greene 2012, pp. 161,
165-66, 172-81).
At the same time, Greene (2012, pp. 169-70, 192-97, 201-04) criticizes
moral readers like Dworkin (1986) and me (2006) for conceiving constitutional
interpretation as being too constrained by fit – in particular, by interpretive
obligation to follow precedents. It seems that, to Greene, Dworkin and I do not
fully acknowledge the primacy of justification over fit. I should say
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emphatically that I welcome this criticism! Moral readers like Dworkin and me
are usually criticized for giving too little room for fit, and too much primacy to
justification (Sebok 1997, pp. 419-20). Since we are being criticized from both
sides, I guess we must be doing something right!
To elaborate, I shall sketch the predicament of moral readers like Dworkin
and me. In general, no one doubts our commitment to the normative dimension
of justification in constitutional interpretation. After all, we argue that
constitutional interpretation is a matter of making moral and philosophical
judgments about the meanings and implications of our constitutional
commitments. The challenge we face is to show that we are not just
elaborating our own liberal commitments for a perfect liberal Constitution
(Monaghan 1981, p. 364). We make three basic responses to these ‘perfect
Constitution’ challenges. First, we argue that it is in the nature of constitutional
interpretation to strive to interpret the Constitution so as to make it the best it
can be (Dworkin 1996, p. 38; Dworkin 1986, p. 255). Second, we show that we
do not believe that the Constitution, even when construed in its best light, is
perfect. For example, Dworkin (1996, p. 36) concedes that the Constitution
does not protect welfare rights (rights which his ideal liberal Constitution
would protect). And I have acknowledged (2006, pp. 220-21) all manner of
constitutional evil, misfortune, stupidity, and tragedy in our constitutional
practice. Third, we argue that our liberal constitutional theories fit the
constitutional document and scheme. They have a firm footing in our extant
constitutional practice and they are not just normative theories that would
justify a perfect liberal Constitution (Fleming 2006, pp. 63, 70, 80-1, 92-8).
Enter my first book, Securing Constitutional Democracy, which Greene
(2012, pp. 169-71, 192-97, 201-04; 2007, pp. 2926-2948) criticizes for giving
primacy to fit over justification. Officially, Dworkin’s moral reading (1986, p.
239) aspires to construct a theory that best fits and justifies our constitutional
document, order, and practice. Yet many critics believe that Dworkin (to use
Greene’s terms) has given ‘primacy to justification’ (2012, pp. 12, 201) and
not enough ‘room for fit’ (2012, p. 204; 2007, p. 2946). They claim that he has
elaborated a perfect liberal constitution but has not done the concrete
groundwork necessary to show that his interpretations of the Constitution
adequately fit our practice, including original meaning and precedents (Greene
2007, p. 2938). In response, I basically say, ‘Do as Dworkin says, not as he
does’ (Fleming 1997, p. 1349). That is, even if Dworkin himself may not
always satisfactorily do the fit work that his own theory calls for, I do take fit
seriously in my book. I seek to remedy the deficiency of Dworkin’s work by
making the fit case for a liberal theory of ‘securing constitutional democracy’
that protects not only basic procedural liberties associated with deliberative
democracy, like the right to vote, but also basic substantive liberties associated
with what I called deliberative autonomy, like the right to marry. Instead of
simply making a normative argument that justice requires protecting a right to
individual autonomy, I undertake an archeological excavation of the legal
materials of our constitutional practice and culture, specifically the line of
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substantive due process cases protecting certain basic liberties associated with
privacy or autonomy (Fleming 2006, pp. 92-8). I ask: what constitutional
theory would best fit and justify these cases? I argue (2006, p. 92-8) that my
‘constitutional constructivism’ better fits and justifies these cases than do
competing theories of originalism (Justice Scalia’s view) or perfecting the
processes of representative democracy or deliberative democracy (Ely’s and
Sunstein’s views) (Ely 1980; Sunstein 1993). Yet my taking this ‘fit’ tack –
doing as Dworkin says, not as he does – is evidently what has prompted
Greene’s criticism (2012, p. 12) that I give too much deference to fit and
precedent and fail to give ‘primacy [to] justification’.
I make three arguments in this Essay. First, I argue that a commitment to fit
(like that in Dworkin’s work and in my book, Securing Constitutional
Democracy) does not necessitate commitment to the view that one has an
interpretive obligation to follow the past – whether concrete original meaning
or precedents. In short, taking fit seriously ≠ interpretive obligation to follow
the past. Nevertheless, fit may figure prominently in a sound account of the
aspiration to fidelity in interpreting the Constitution.
Second, I argue that interpreters who aspire to fidelity in constitutional
interpretation have a responsibility to construct an account that not only
justifies but also fits our constitutional document, order, and practice. But the
aspiration to fidelity itself does not entail an interpretive obligation to follow
the past. In short, taking fidelity seriously ≠ interpretive obligation to the past.
In this section I will comment in more detail on fidelity without obligation and
without originalism, sketching the account of fidelity in pursuit of our
aspirations that I am developing in my book in progress, Fidelity to Our
Imperfect Constitution.
Third, I argue that fit and justification are co-original and of equal weight,
instead of justification having ‘primacy’ over while also leaving ‘room for fit’.
Here I shall say more about fit in relation to justification and fidelity in
constitutional interpretation.
III. TAKING FIT SERIOUSLY ≠ INTERPRETIVE OBLIGATION TO FOLLOW THE
PAST
Do Dworkin’s and my commitment to taking fit as well as justification
seriously entail a commitment to interpretive obligation to follow the past,
whether concrete original meaning or precedent? In making the ‘fit’ case for
my theory, I present precedents in the line of substantive due process decisions
as bones or shards of a constitutional culture, as provisional fixed points that a
constitutional constructivist archaeologist, or interpreter, has a responsibility to
fit and justify (Fleming 2006, p. 93). I argue that a constructivist interpreter
would not be free to cast out the substantive shards and bones in the way that
an originalist or process-perfecter would (2006, p. 94). This is not to say that
judges, much less citizens, have an obligation to follow the past. Rather, it is to
say that our pictures of our constitutional practice will be more recognizable –
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and be better accounts – if we can work up an account that fits and justifies the
durable lines of doctrine.
I do not offer a theory of precedent or stare decisis as such, nor do I justify
following precedent for any of the reasons people commonly offer to justify
this practice – reasons that Greene considers and rejects as inadequate (2012,
pp. 190-99). As a matter of fact, I do not believe that anyone has a strong sense
of obligation to follow precedent as such in constitutional interpretation.
Fidelity to our imperfect Constitution, I would argue – and thanks to Greene
I now see this more clearly – entails rejecting any obligation to follow original
meaning or precedent. As I have argued elsewhere (2006, pp. 226-27), if our
Constitution were conceived merely as consisting of original expected
applications or precedents, it would not deserve our fidelity. The Constitution,
to be worthy of our fidelity, must reflect our aspirations to realize the ends
proclaimed in the Preamble. For the Constitution to do that, we must reject any
idea of an obligation to follow original expected applications or precedents as
such. Fidelity to our imperfect Constitution entails fidelity in pursuit of our
constitutional aspirations and ends.
What is more, I do not see fit as I practice it as imposing an obligation to
follow the past in a way that Greene would find objectionable. The dimension
of fit basically does two things. First, it screens out purely utopian
interpretations that have no claim on us by insisting upon showing the footing
of the interpretation in our constitutional practice. Hence, even if we are
constructing a moral reading – and even if we are giving primacy to
justification – we give room for fit to show that the interpretation is an
interpretation of our constitutional practice, not that of a perfectly just
Constitution. Second, fit screens out off-the-wall interpretations (which are not
necessarily utopian). Indeed, fit indicates that the proffered interpretation has a
footing in our practice.
Furthermore, if one conceives constitutional interpretation and justification
as constructivist, as I do, one sees our principles as manifested in and growing
out of our constitutional commitments and practice, not abstract ideas of what
justice requires (Fleming 2006, pp. 6, 62, 66, 92-4). Within constructivism, one
sees the dimension of fit as bound up with the dimension of justification: we
are trying to work up the best justification for the extant materials of the
constitutional practice.
In response to Greene’s argument that Dworkin and I give too much
deference or weight to precedent, I should clarify my views about the place of
precedent in constitutional interpretation. I would say that, if one thinks of
precedents as good-faith efforts to work out the best understanding of our
constitutional commitments, one should give them some weight and approach
them with some humility. I hasten to add that, to accept this approach, one
need not and should not embrace a thoroughgoing Burkeanism. Greene (2012,
pp. 194-95) aptly criticizes Burkean justifications for following precedent as
such. One need not give precedents presumptive weight or ‘deference’, to use
Greene’s formulations (2012, pp. 192-93, 197-98).
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Ironically, moral readers and common law constitutionalists may give more
weight to precedent than do originalists. For one thing, originalists officially
give greater weight to concrete original meaning and are dubious about
precedents they see as inconsistent with concrete original meaning (Balkin
2011, p. 14). Indeed, some originalists, like Gary Lawson, reject precedent
altogether (Lawson 2007, p. 4; Lawson 1994, p. 24). Others, like Justice
Scalia, make a ‘pragmatic exception’ to originalism to accommodate precedent
(Scalia 1997, p. 140). By contrast, moral readers and living constitutionalists
(more precisely, common law constitutionalists) conceive the Constitution as a
frame of government and scheme of abstract powers and rights, the meaning of
which must be elaborated over time. They deny that the framers and ratifiers
resolved our problems for us. Accordingly, they may give greater weight to
interpreters’ good-faith efforts to work out the frame or scheme over time. I
say ‘ironically’ because living constitutionalists always emphasize flexibility
and change, and argue against being tied down by the past. Yet they may be
more tied down by precedent than originalists are. This is so in part because
they conceive of precedents as part of the constitutional practice that we are
trying to carry on in a principled, coherent way.
In my observation, though, no one, or hardly anyone, believes that we have
a strong obligation to follow precedents as such. And this is as it should be. At
any given time, a body of law will be riven by competing substantive ideals
and competing approaches to interpretation. Proponents and opponents of a
given view will win some cases and lose others. The conflicting views are
embodied in the cases as they develop. And so, one cannot operate under a
strong obligation to follow precedents as such and still make defensible
decisions.
Furthermore, as Sotirios Barber and I have argued (2007, pp. 135-40, 190),
we cannot make recourse to precedent to avoid making moral and philosophic
choices in constitutional interpretation. Instead, we use precedent and
argument concerning its implications as a site on which to do battle over and
choose among competing views. Thus, precedent is a site or battleground for
making moral and philosophic choices. The precedents themselves do not
settle the questions and make the choices for us.
I do not consider it a weakness of precedent that people are willing to
disregard it when they believe a previous case was wrongly decided, instead of
adhere to it. Or, more likely, they argue that the precedent in its implications
supports what they think is the best interpretation and the best moral and
philosophic choice in the case before them. That is the strength of precedent!
We argue about and from precedents, not because we have an obligation to
follow them or because they decide our cases for us; instead, we do so to
elaborate the meaning and best understanding of our constitutional
commitments. We ask whether the precedent was rightly decided because we
are striving to make our constitutional commitments the best they can be.
Precedents inform our judgment and they provide evidence of the best
understanding of our commitments, but they do not themselves make those
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judgments for us. We have to make those judgments ourselves: that is why we
cannot and do not simply stand as decided.
IV. TAKING FIDELITY SERIOUSLY ≠ INTERPRETIVE OBLIGATION TO THE PAST
In my book in progress, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, I argue in
the spirit of Dworkin that, if we aspire to fidelity to the Constitution, a moral
reading is superior to originalism (at least all varieties of originalism besides
Balkin’s abstract living originalism, which I interpret as a moral reading)
(Fleming 2012a, pp. 1175-1177; Fleming 2012b, pp. 675-79). The aspiration to
fidelity
raises two fundamental questions: Fidelity to what? and What is fidelity?
The short answer to the first – fidelity to the Constitution – poses a
further question: What is the Constitution? For example, does the
Fourteenth Amendment embody abstract moral principles or enact
relatively concrete historical rules? . . . The short answer to the second –
being faithful to the Constitution in interpreting it – leads to another
question: How should the Constitution be interpreted? Does faithfulness
to the Fourteenth Amendment require recourse to political theory to
elaborate general moral concepts or prohibit it and instead require
historical research to discover relatively specific original understanding or
meaning? And does the quest for fidelity in interpreting the Constitution
exhort us to make it the best it can be or forbid us to do so in favor of
enforcing an imperfect Constitution (Fleming 1997, p. 1335)?
Let’s begin with the question, Fidelity to what? My answer is fidelity to our
abstract constitutional aspirations, including ends, principles, and basic
liberties. Fidelity to our aspirations does not entail obligation to follow the past
in the sense of either concrete original meaning or precedents. That would
enshrine an imperfect Constitution that falls short of our aspirations and does
not deserve our fidelity. We should treat precedents as evidence, factors, or
resources, but not as obligations. They are to be taken into account, but
followed only to the extent that they accord with our best understanding of our
aspirations.
Next, let’s consider the other question, What is fidelity? It is not fealty, or
subservience. It is not following the authority of the past in the manner of an
authoritarian originalism. Furthermore, it is not obligation to the concrete past,
whether original meaning or precedents. Rather, fidelity is honoring our
aspirations and pursuing our commitments by furthering our best
understandings of them. The concrete original meaning and precedents are
evidence of good-faith efforts to pursue those aspirations, but they are not the
aspirations themselves. They have no doubt fallen short of our aspirations. If
following those sources from the past dishonors our aspirations and
undermines our commitments, we have good reasons to reject them in order to
pursue our aspirations and commitments.

8

Moreover – to return to the question, Fidelity to what? – we should aspire to
fidelity to our scheme as an ongoing frame of government pursuing the ends of
the Preamble, not as a set of concrete original meanings or a string of
precedents. Again, I do not say that we have an obligation to follow the
concrete past, though I do say that we aspire to fidelity to the Constitution.
How can we honor fidelity while rejecting obligation to the concrete past?
If we conceive the Constitution as a frame of government, to be lived under
and worked out over time, we can approach it with an attitude of fidelity but
without an obligation of obedience to concrete expected applications or
precedents. Fidelity on this understanding entails a commitment to making the
frame of government work, to learning from experience, and to interpreting the
Constitution so as to further its ends and realize its aspirations.
Fidelity? Yes. Commitment? Yes. Obligation or obedience in an
authoritarian sense to original expected applications or precedents? No.
Fidelity is not obedience to decisions already made for us in the past by people
who are long dead and who were ignorant of the challenges and problems of
our age. Fidelity, rather, is an attitude of commitment to making the scheme
work and to further developing it, building it out over time, as Balkin puts it
(2011, p. 5), in ways to better realize its ends and our aspirations. Or, as
Dworkin and I put it (Dworkin 1986, p. 255; Fleming 2006, pp. 16, 211, 225,
227), to making the Constitution the best it can be.
V.

FIT AND JUSTIFICATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

Finally, I shall assess Greene’s formulations about the ‘primacy of
justification’ and ‘room for fit’. Greene argues (2012, pp. 201-06) against
interpretive obligation to follow the past, but he allows ‘room for fit’. He
acknowledges that in particular cases there can be good reasons for following
past decisions. As Balkin puts it (2011, pp. 256-59), evidence of concrete
original meanings and precedents serve as a resource, not a constraint, in
constitutional interpretation. Similarly, Greene says (2012, pp. 192, 197, 206)
that they serve as a factor, not an obligation.
I agree completely with Greene’s conception of ‘room for fit’ (2012, pp.
204-06). Yet he says that people like Dworkin and me want to treat fit as more
than a factor (Greene 2012, p. 192-93, 196-97). Greene conceives of a
presumption of deference as lying on the terrain between fit being a factor and
fit being an obligation and situates Dworkin and me at that point. I think that
Dworkin and I give similar room for fit, and we similarly treat fit as a factor
though not an obligation. If I appear to treat fit as more than a factor, I suspect
that it is simply because I have attempted to provide a corrective to Dworkin’s
work – to do as he says, not as he does. I suspect that most readers outside our
family quarrel would argue that Dworkin and I, like Greene, do give primacy
to justification over fit (or indeed that we give too little room for fit).
I would resist framing the issue in terms of whether fit or justification has
primacy. Both dimensions enter into interpretation, and they are intertwined.
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There is no raw or bare fit that is prior to or apart from justification, nor is
there any justification divorced from fit that has any purchase on us.
What is more, I do not believe that Greene has made the case for the
primacy of justification over fit. He has, admittedly, made the case for the
unavoidability of justification as well as fit, and the inextricable connection
between them. I would argue instead that fit and justification are co-original
and of equal weight1. Both are inherently involved in constitutional
interpretation. Both stem from the basic aim of developing the best
interpretation.
In places, Dworkin (1986, pp. 65-6) almost seems to regret drawing the
distinction between the two dimensions of fit and justification. Doing so is
important for analytical clarity, but it may lead people to see the two
dimensions as more distinct than they are, as if they correspond to a two-step
process. And it may lead them to view the two dimensions as sequential rather
than as dimensions of a holistic judgment: as in, first we fit and then we justify
(Solum 2010, pp. 553-54). And it may lead them to argue that one or the other
is primary. For example, they might argue that ‘fit is everything’, to the
exclusion of justification (McConnell 1997, p. 1292). Or, even if fit is not
everything, that fit has primacy over justification. Or, to the contrary, that
justification has primacy over fit. This is what Greene argues (2012, pp. 20104).
In Securing Constitutional Democracy, I spoke (2006, pp. 5, 63, 84, 92-3,
97-8) of the best interpretation as that which provides the best fit with and
justification of the constitutional document, order, and practice. Thus, I
purposely avoided splitting up these two dimensions. Having said that, I should
acknowledge that I do make a fit case for my theory of securing constitutional
democracy. But I hasten to add that, at the same time, I make the case that my
theory justifies our constitutional document, order, and practice.
In writing the book, Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions with
Sotirios Barber, I initially wanted to refer to the two dimensions of fit and
justification, but Barber insisted that we avoid this distinction. For him,
interpretation is just a matter of giving the best account of honoring
constitutional commitments and furthering constitutional ends. I have come to
see the wisdom of this view of fit and justification as inextricably bound
together in the idea of giving the best account.
At the same time, I should emphasize that there is analytical power and
clarity in distinguishing fit and justification and acknowledge that I myself
have distinguished the two in my own work (Fleming 2006; Fleming 1997, pp.
1348-1352). As against those who argue that ‘fit is everything’, I have argued
that fit alone is insufficient to resolve the clash between competing
interpretations in hard cases. We have to resort to justification to do so. As
stated above, my taking fit seriously shows that my moral readings have a firm
1

I apply the idea ‘co-original and of equal weight’ in analogous contexts
(Rawls 1995, as cited in Fleming 2006, p. 78).
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footing in our constitutional practice. Furthermore, fit enables people to see
their aspirations in the Constitution. Finally, fit enables us to criticize others’
views as revisionist, radical, or subversive. For example, I can criticize the Tea
Party as revisionist, radical, and subversive because they cannot even fit much
of our twenty-first century constitutional practice. To be sure, I can also
criticize them on normative grounds of justification: they have a deficient,
unjust normative theory, one moreover that falls short of or misses the mark on
our aspirations in the Preamble to the Constitution.
These uses of fit show the analytical power, in certain contexts, of stressing
fit. But that is not to say that, even here, fit is entirely distinct from
justification. To recall Greene’s formulation (2012, pp. 192, 197, 206), I would
say that, in these ways, fit is a factor in constitutional interpretation. In my
book, I shall say more about how fit factors in constitutional interpretation –
even perfectionist interpretation that aspires to interpret the Constitution so as
to make it the best it can be and worthy of our fidelity.
I doubt that Greene would object to what I have said here about fit and
justification. To recapitulate: if I seem to give primacy to fit over justification,
it is because I strive to show that my theory – though a Constitution-perfecting
theory – is a theory of our constitutional order, not one of a perfect liberal
Constitution. Like Greene, I view fit with original meaning and precedent as a
resource for deciding constitutional meaning, as a factor in making
constitutional decisions, and as evidence of the content of our commitments
and indeed of political justice. Even though interpreters do not have an
obligation to follow the past, they may be more effective in persuading people
that their interpretations are faithful to the Constitution’s aspirations if they can
make an argument that their interpretation both fits with and justifies the
constitutional document, underlying constitutional order, and evolved
constitutional practice.
Finally, I would like to make an observation concerning Michael Seidman’s
evident view, in his book Constitutional Disobedience, related to fit and
justification. If Greene would give primacy to justification over fit, it seems
that Seidman (2013, pp. 11-28) would throw out fit altogether and the
Constitution along with it. As he titled an op-ed piece in the New York Times:
‘Let’s [g]ive up on the Constitution’ (Seidman 2012, p. A19). Evidently that
would leave only normative arguments about the best thing to do. It is not clear
to me that normative arguments without regard to fit with the extant
constitutional document, doctrine, and practice will be superior to our current
forms of argument. Normative arguments tend to be more persuasive to people
when they are cast in terms of realizing our commitments and aspirations than
when they are cast simply as arguments for an ideal state of affairs. Similarly, I
believe that, to a greater degree than is commonly appreciated, normative
argument, at least in our political and constitutional culture, is more
constructivist than utopian. It articulates the ideals implicit in our practices.
Seidman might say this is a bad thing – that it shows the degree to which the
Constitution has constricted our thinking about justice and other good things.
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But I believe that our thinking about justice is enriched through constructivism,
as compared with what it would be like if we did away with the Constitution or
simply asked ourselves what justice requires as a utopian matter (Seidman
2013, pp. 139-43). Constitutional arguments that fit and justify our
constitutional document and practice exert a greater claim on people than do
utopian arguments, for the former are arguments about the best understanding
of our practices, commitments, and aspirations.
But this is not to say that in keeping the Constitution, instead of doing away
with it, we are saying we have an interpretive obligation to follow the past.
Similarly, we are not engaging in constitutional disobedience if we reject
concrete original meaning or precedents. To the contrary, I would argue that by
doing so we are pursuing constitutional fidelity.
In the passage quoted in the epigraph with which I began this Essay, Justice
Holmes (1920, p. 139) famously wrote that ‘historic continuity with the past is
not a duty, it is only a necessity’. I suppose that Holmes meant that somehow
there is no avoiding following the past. I do not endorse Holmes’s evidently
deterministic view. I, like Greene, would agree with Holmes that following the
past is not a duty. Unlike Holmes, however, I would say that it is a necessity in
the weaker sense that, to be persuasive in our constitutional culture, one
generally needs to argue that one’s interpretations fit with the past, show the
past in its best light (as Dworkin and I put it), or redeem the promises of our
abstract moral commitments and aspirations (as Balkin puts it) (Balkin 2011,
pp. 74-81). This is not originalism. It is a moral reading that aspires to fidelity
to our imperfect Constitution.

12

References
Balkin, JM 2011, Living originalism, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
MA.
Barber, SA & Fleming, JE 2007, Constitutional interpretation: the basic
questions, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Cohen, M 1977, ‘He’d rather have rights’, N.Y. Rev. Books (May 26, 1977),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1977/may/26/hed-ratherhave-rights, archived at http://perma.cc/6XBF-VPRF (reviewing
Dworkin, 1977).
Dworkin, R 1977, Taking rights seriously, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA.
Dworkin, R 1986, Law’s empire, Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA.
Dworkin, R 1996, Freedom’s law: the moral reading of the American
Constitution, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Dworkin, R. 1997, ‘The arduous virtue of fidelity: originalism, Scalia, Tribe,
and nerve’, Fordham Law Review, vol. 65, pp. 1249-68.
Dworkin, R 2004, ‘Rawls and the law’, Fordham Law Review, vol. 72, pp.
1387-1406.
Dworkin, R 2010a, ‘Justice for hedgehogs’, Boston University Law Review,
vol. 90, pp. 469-477.
Dworkin, R 2010b, ‘Response’, Boston University Law Review, vol. 90, pp.
1059-89.
Ely, JH 1980, Democracy and distrust: a theory of judicial review, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Fleming, JE 1997, ‘Fidelity to our imperfect Constitution’, Fordham Law
Review, vol. 65, pp. 1335-1349.
Fleming, JE 2006, Securing constitutional democracy, University of Chicago
Press, Chicago.
Fleming, JE 2009, ‘Ronald Dworkin’, in The Yale biographical dictionary of
American law (Roger K. Newman ed.), pp. 178-79.

13

Fleming, JE 2012a, ‘Living originalism and living constitutionalism as moral
readings of the American Constitution’, Boston University Law
Review, vol. 92, pp. 1171-1177.
Fleming, JE 2012b, ‘The Balkinization of originalism’, University of Illinois
Law Review, vol. 2012, no. 3, pp. 669-79.
Fleming, JE 2013, ‘Fit, justification, and fidelity in constitutional
interpretation’, Boston University Law Review, vol. 93, pp. 12831295.
Fleming, JE 2014, ‘Introduction to the symposium on Ronald Dworkin’s
Religion without God’, Boston University Law Review, vol. 94, pp.
1201-05.
Fleming, JE & McClain, LC 2013, Ordered liberty: rights, responsibilities,
and virtues, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Fleming, JE forthcoming, Fidelity to our imperfect Constitution, Oxford
University Press (on file with author).
Gardner, J. ‘Ronald Dworkin, 1931-2013’, Univ. of Oxford (Feb. 15, 2013),
http://www.law.ox.ac. uk/newsitem=537, archived at
http://perma.cc/F9NS-R3TW.
Greene, AS 2007, ‘The fit dimension’, Fordham Law Review, vol. 75, pp.
2926-2948.
Greene, AS 2012, Against obligation: the multiple sources of authority in a
liberal democracy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Holmes, OW 1920, ‘Learning and science’, in Collected legal papers,
Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York City, NY.
Lawson, G 1994, ‘The constitutional case against precedent’, Harvard Journal
of Law and Public Policy, vol. 17, pp. 23-4.
Lawson, G 2007, ‘Mostly unconstitutional: the case against precedent
revisited’, Ave Maria Law Review, vol. 5, pp. 1-4.
McConnell, MW 1997, ‘The importance of humility in judicial review: a
comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “moral reading” of the Constitution’,
Fordham Law Review, vol. 65, pp. 1269-1292.
Monaghan, HP 1981, ‘Our perfect Constitution’, New York University Law
Review, vol. 56, pp. 353-64.

14

Rawls, J 1995, ‘Reply to Habermas’, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 92, pp.
132-63.
Scalia, A 1997, ‘Response’, in A Gutmann (ed.), A matter of interpretation:
federal courts and the law, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Sebok, AJ 1997, ‘The insatiable Constitution’, Southern California Law
Review, vol. 70, pp. 419-20.
Seidman, LM 2012, ‘Let’s give up on the Constitution’, The New York Times,
31 December, p. A19.
Seidman, LM 2013, On constitutional disobedience, Oxford University Press,
Oxford.
Solum, LB 2010, ‘The unity of interpretation’, Boston University Law Review,
vol. 90, pp 551-54.
Strauss, DA 2010, The living Constitution, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Sunstein, CR 1993, The partial Constitution, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA.

15

